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The Small, the Young and the Innovative.
A Panel Data Analysis of Constraints on
External Innovation Financing∗
Daniel S. Hain and Jesper Lindgaard Christensen
Aalborg University, Department of Business and Management, IKE / DRUID, Denmark
Abstract: This article investigates how access to external financing for innovation
activities is affected by firm-specific structural, behavioral and outcome characteristics.
External financing represents a critical factor in determining industrial evolution and
technical change as well as firm’s ability to survive, grow, and engage in innovative
activities. Some characteristics of firms particularly associated with innovative and en-
trepreneurial ventures driving technological change are said to cause information asym-
metries between financiers and finance seekers, making them less likely raise necessary
external capital to fund innovation projects. Yet, there is little known about how dif-
ferent combinations of these characteristics affects their access to external financing and
how contextual factors matter. Deploying a two-stage Heckman probit model on a panel
data set spanning the period 2000-2013 and covering 1,169 Danish firms, we test hypothe-
ses derived from the literature regarding the impacts of firms structural, behavioral and
outcome characteristics on the firm’s likelihood to get constrained in their access to ex-
ternal innovation finance. In line with earlier research we find that indeed the type of
innovation matters for the access to external finance, but in a more nuanced way than
generally portrayed. While incremental innovation activities have little negative effect
on the access to external finance, radical innovation activities tend to be penalized by
capital markets.
JEL classification: O31, G23, G24, L25
Keywords: Financial constraints, financing innovation, asymmetric in-
formation
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1 Introduction
For many firms access to external financing represents a critical factor in determin-
ing a firm’s ability to survive, grow, and engage in innovative activities (Beck and
Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Mina et al., 2013; Musso and Schiavo, 2008). Likewise, indus-
try evolution and technological change requires adequate funding, and the structure
and governance of financial systems impacts the direction of industrial and techni-
cal change (Dosi, 1990; Mazzucato, 2013; Tylecote, 2007). Yet, some characteristics
of firms particularly associated with innovative and entrepreneurial ventures driving
technological change make them less likely to raise the necessary external capital to
fund innovation projects.
Particularly firms who are young, small, and engaged in innovation and other activ-
ities characterized by uncertainty, are said to cause information asymmetries between
financiers and finance seekers, making them less likely to raise the necessary external
capital to fund innovation projects (Carreira and Silva, 2010; Freel, 2007; Hall, 2010).
Yet, small and entrepreneurial ventures are important carriers of innovation and the
associated industrial and technological change (Audretsch, 2006; King and Levine,
1993a,b; Wennekers and Thurik, 1999), where the existence of financial constraints
might be a serious impediment to their future growth and survival (Stucki, 2013).
In this article we investigate how access to external financing for innovation activi-
ties is affected by firm-specific structural, behavioral and outcome characteristics. We
here term variables describing firms in their objective dimensions such as size, age, lo-
cation and ownership as structural characteristics, whereas behavioral characteristics
are related to firms revealed innovation activities, and outcome characteristics to their
realized and projected economic performance. We propose that not a single but rather
certain combinations of characteristics and context makes firms more likely to not find
their financial needs met. We attempt to identify combinations of firm characteristics
associated with potentially innovative ventures that lead to a disproportionate likeli-
hood of credit rationing. Since a large proportion of firms do not demand external
finance (Nightingale and Coad, 2014), we also also take into account the heterogeneity
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of financial needs. Moreover, in addition to incorporation the demand for finance and
focus on combinations of potential characteristics, behavior and outcomes as potential
explanations on financial constraints we differentiate our study from existing studies in
that we use yearly, consistent innovation and finance surveys over a long time span (14
years). In this sense we contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics of the fi-
nancing of entrepreneurship and innovation, an area that is generally under-researched
(Hall, 2010; Hall and Lerner, 2009).
Using a 2-stage heckman probit model accounting for the heterogeneous need for
external finance, we test hypotheses derived from the literature regarding the impact
of firms structural, behavioral and outcome characteristics on capital access. We use
a unique firm-level dataset composed of longitudinal survey data coupled with perfor-
mance indicators, allowing us to incorporate micro-level firm characteristics. While
the vast majority of existing studies rely on cross-sectional data, our panel data struc-
ture also allows us to control for contextual time-variant factors, such as the impact of
business cycles. The data comprise a yearly survey of innovation activities and finan-
cial constraints that covers 14 years, from 2000 through 2013, with consistent question
structure on both demand and supply of external financing. Compared to traditional
innovation surveys (such as CIS), the data include more frequent rounds of surveying
and a more detailed set of questions on finance. We find evidence that the effect of
innovation on capital demand and supply is not uniform, but rather interdependent
with other firm characteristics. Specifically, we find that the type of innovation is
an important factor. While incremental innovation activities have little effect on the
access to external finance, radical innovation activities tend to be penalized by capital
markets. This appears to be particularly true for small innovators. We link these
findings to how capital markets assess information flows.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we first survey the
existing literature with respect to earlier, general studies of financial constraints, and
derive a set of testable hypotheses on the interplay of innovation intensity, other firm
characteristics and contextual factors.. The empirical strategy, data, and variables
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are presented and explained in section 3. Section 4 reports and discusses the results,
followed by a conclusion in section 5.
2 Financial Constraints - Theory and Hypotheses
2.1 Innovation, information asymmetries, and financial constraints
Investments in innovation – mostly associated with R&D expenditures – are said
to embody characteristics making them substantially different from other investments
in several respects (Hall, 2010; Hall and Lerner, 2009). From a financier perspective,
investing in radically innovative firms vis-á-vis their not or only moderately innovative
counterparts, is foremost associated with higher information asymmetries between firm
and financier, and related with higher risk and uncertainty (Dosi and Orsenigo, 1988)
of investment outcomes.
Asymmetric information has been long recognized as a generic source of market fail-
ure in buyer-seller (Akerlof, 1970) commodity markets as well investor-investee (Myers
and Majluf, 1984) capital markets. Such information asymmetries can be assumed to
increase with rate and radicalness of the firm’s innovation activities. This is because
the information required to correctly assess innovative ventures is usually (i) private,
and thus only given voluntarily (Moro et al., 2014) since firms may fear misuse and
be reluctant to share it (Anton and Yao, 2002); (ii) complex, thus requiring in-depth
knowledge regarding applied technologies or market circumstances; (iii) to a large ex-
tent tacit, thus requiring spatial proximity and face-to-face contact with financiers in
order to be transferred (Arrow, 1962; Von Hippel, 1994); and (iv) innovation processes
are reliant upon and embedded in human capital, which is often volatile and not easily
maintained in the firm. The intangible nature of many innovation processes, and the
fact that they have long time lags from initiation to returns, means that financiers are
faced with projects for which they have little possibility of estimating the returns, as
well as poor options to cover the risk by way of collateral.
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Due to these informational deficiencies, and their often weaker balance sheets and
frequent lack of fixed assets that could act as collateral, innovative firms are said to
have a greater need to communicate their merits to financiers. The means of doing this
vary greatly. In the literature on relationship banking (e.g. Berger and Udell, 2002),
it is argued that repetitive communication and transactions lead to the building of
trust, which in turn facilitates smooth communication and reduces both information
asymmetries and the likelihood of moral hazard. An emerging literature on financial
signaling focuses on the patenting behavior of firms as a mean of overcoming these
informational barriers (Harhoff, 2011; Häussler et al., 2014), especially in the early
stage of development (Hoenen et al., 2014).
The proposition that innovative firms are somewhat more likely to face financial
constraints is supported by a growing body of empirical evidence. Westhead and
Storey (1997) identify the most technologically sophisticated firms as much more likely
to report that continual financial constraints had impeded firm growth. Czarnitzki
and Hottenrott (2011) report similar findings especially for small R&D intensive firms.
Freel (1999) identifies innovating firms as more likely to seek but less likely to obtain
bank loans. Later, Freel (2007) added to earlier results, clarifying that even though a
little innovation seems to be a good thing, more intensively innovating and small firms
appear to be less successful in obtaining external financing.
The majority of studies have used firms in R&D-intensive industries, patenting firms,
or the simple separation of firms into innovative and non-innovative categories as prox-
ies for innovation. For example, Hall (2010) argues that using R&D as a proxy for
innovation is justified because it makes up a major portion of innovation expendi-
tures in firms in CIS-like surveys. However, despite the fact that R&D expenditures
are a substantial part of innovation expenditures, only a minority of innovating firms
has any R&D at all. Many of the changes in products, processes, and services are
incremental, new-to-firm innovation. Consequently, it is important to recognize that
innovation is ubiquitous and depends often on modes of doing and using technologies
rather than being based on science or R&D (Jensen et al., 2007). Mina et al. (2013)
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report firms engaged especially in process innovation (often associated with efficiency
increasing incremental innovation) to attract more capital, while innovation projects
with long-payoff periods deter financiers. They further highlight the limited validity of
using R&D expenditure as sole measurement which relates firm level innovation with
financial constraints.
Similarly, it is likely that these problems are exacerbated by the innovation intensity
of firms, rather than being dependent on whether firms are innovative or not. This
is easily seen if the perspective of the financier is taken: in a mediocre innovative
firm where innovation activities make up a small share of turnover, the information
asymmetries and uncertainty related to innovation will not pose substantial difficulties
in assessment of creditworthiness. This changes when investing in firms generating a
major share of their turnover with outcomes of recent innovation projects. It can be
concluded that the relationship between innovation and financial constraints might be
more nuanced than commonly depicted (Bellucci et al., 2014), particularly with respect
to the intensity and type of innovation activities, and the combination with other
firm characteristics. From this discussion we derive that we should not approach the
analysis by just using a dichotomous variable indicating if the firm displays innovation
activities or not, but rather a scale reflecting the firm’s innovation intensity. Moreover,
the radical innovation projects involve additional asymmetries of information and time-
lags between investments and outcome, again meaning a higher likelihood of financial
constraints.
Hypothesis 1
a Firms with a higher innovation intensity show a higher probability of being financially con-
strained.
b This effect is more pronounced for firms engaged in radical vis-á-vis incremental innovation
activity
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2.2 Structural characteristics: The liability of newness and smallness
Though it is often highlighted as a major barrier to business development (Bottazzi
et al., 2014; Musso and Schiavo, 2008), the mere existence as well as economic signifi-
cance of credit rationing, and so-called debt gaps for SMEs, is also contested (Berger
and Udell, 2003; Cressy, 2012; Levenson and Willard, 2000). However, literature stem-
ming from the strand of SME finance consistently identifies two characteristics of firms
as being associated with asymmetric information, and consequently more financial
constraints: being young and/or small. Reasons put forward are among others the
liabilities of newness and size limitations, asymmetric information, agency problems,
and the high, fixed costs of screening and monitoring such firms when compared to the
potential profit for the financing institution (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Canepa
and Stoneman, 2008; Carreira and Silva, 2010; Fazzari et al., 1988; Murray, 1999).
As illustrated above, in the case of innovation-intense firms, traditional investors
with only a limited understanding of firms’ processes, products, and markets face huge
difficulties in assessing the quality of their innovation processes without undertaking
substantial efforts in gathering tacit information. Until this point, we assumed the
financier to be in need of understanding the very essence of the firm’s innovation
activities. However, traditional financiers such as banks, representing the major source
of external capital to firms, also rely to a high degree on the available factual, or
“hard”, information, such as a firm’s financial history, capital structure, and available
collateral, when assessing creditworthiness. By doing so, they leave the selection of
opaque innovation projects to the firm, if the firm fulfills other requirements based on
hard information. In this sense, hard and soft information regarding the firm can serve
as imperfect substitutes for an assessment of creditworthiness without directly taking
the nature of its innovation projects into account. Yet, in the case of small and/or
young firms, which tend to be more opaque to financiers (Berger et al., 2001), salient
hard information such as rated debt, certified financial statements, annual reports,
and other forms of codified signals and track records are often not available (Uzzi,
1999; Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003). In the absence of both hard and soft information,
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firms may face substantial obstacles in obtaining external financing, especially for
their innovation projects. Consequently, we expect the effects of size, age, and the
frequency of innovation projects to interact in a multiplicative rather than additive
way, thus more than proportionally worsening a firm’s access to external financing.
Hypothesis 2
a Firms that are young and innovative show a disproportionally high probability of being
financially constrained.
b Firms that are small and innovative show a disproportional high probability of being finan-
cially constrained.
c Both the effect of newness and smallness are more pronounced for firms engaged in radical
vis-à-vis incremental innovation activity
2.3 Outcome characteristics: Performance and expectations
Whether a firm obtains external financing or not could in a world with perfect in-
formation be a simple function of self-assessed economic performance. In the absence
of information asymmetries, a firm’s expectation regarding its future financial per-
formance is a perfect forecast and coincident with the banks assessment. However,
in a real world asymmetric information and moral hazard drive a wedge between the
borrowers and lenders ability to assess creditworthiness, and thus between supply and
demand for external capital. Assuming the firm to be in possession of the most com-
plete information set available to evaluate the performance of its innovation projects
(Kon and Storey, 2003; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), the own projection of current and
future financial performance should still serves as suitable approximation for its cred-
itworthiness.
As a major source of information asymmetries, we expect a firms’ innovation inten-
sity to increase the wedge between a firm’s self-assessed current and future financial
performance and the access to external finance. We expect this to be particularly
true for the case of positive performance projections, which are only partially received
by the financier and lead to a situation of capital undersupply, as illustrated in the
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Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model. However, this might also work the other way. Since
this information is discounted by financiers and determines the lending decision and
its conditions, firms have an incentive to act opportunistically and find ways to bias
financiers in their favor, such as overstating progress in new product development or
concealing critical strategic or technical details. This would lead to a situation such as
the one depicted in the (De Meza and Webb, 1987) model, in which financiers arbitrar-
ily provide credit to good and bad borrowers and lead to an oversupply of capital. It
could be argued that financiers are primarily concerned with the financial performance
of their portfolio firms. However, information on this is not easily available to the
financier ex ante. We therefore posit that:
Hypothesis 3
a: A firms’ current and projected economic performance influences their likelihood to meet
financial constraints.
b: The relationship between economic performance and financial constraints is weaker in firms
with higher innovation intensity.
Performance is here seen as how firms report their short-term profit expectations.
A major merit of operationalizing financial performance according to the firm’s own
perceptions and expectations is that, in the case of innovative firms, this fully captures
all their knowledge and their belief in the profitability of their innovation project,
which cannot be captured by ex-post financial statements due to endogeneity issues.
Innovation intensity is operationalized as firms’ number of innovations which are new
to the market as opposed to innovations only new to the firm (see also section 3 on
variable description).
3 Econometric Modeling of Credit Demand and Supply
3.1 Data sources and context
Our primary data come from surveys of the management teams of a representative
panel of private firms with at least five employees in North Jutland, Denmark. Re-
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spondents were interviewed1 about their views of the past and future development
of variables like production, employment, profit, innovation activities, and access to
financial capital. To ensure a shared understanding, the questions on innovation were
posed only to a sub-sample of the population of private sector firms, such as those
in the manufacturing industry and business services. The phrasing of the questions
largely followed the form in which Community Innovation Surveys (CIS) pose questions
on innovation and finance (e.g. Canepa and Stoneman, 2008; Pellegrino and Savona,
2013), making the results comparable to studies based on CIS data. The data are not
fully representative of the total private business sector in the region, but within the
sectors, there is a good match between the realized sample and the population of firms.
Due to the focus of the survey, we only included firms reporting that they currently
engage in innovation activities or plan to do so in the future.
Our case region is located in the north of Denmark, which is characterized as a
peripheral area. This is illustrated by the fact that it has been an EU support Objective
2 area for years. There is one urban center, Aalborg, and the industry structure is
somewhat different within the region, with the majority of R&D-based firms being in
the Aalborg area. The total population in the region is around 600,000. One previous
study on financial constraints in this region (Christensen, 2007) resembles our study;
however, it was focused on a pre-crisis period and did not incorporate all constraints
and statistical controls.
3.2 Variable description
The following subsection briefly describes the variables utilized in the empirical
analysis and gives suggestions regarding their impact. An exhaustive description of all
variables can be found in table 4.
1In 1999-2010, data were collected through telephone interviews, whereas they were thereafter col-
lected by means of a web-based questionnaire. This change has affected response rates negatively
while not necessarily affecting representativeness to the same degree.
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Dependent variables
Our main dependent variable of interest (constraints) is dichotomous and derived
from the survey answers whether the firm experienced constraints in raising exter-
nal capital to finance innovation projects in the corresponding period (0:No, 1:Yes).
Additionally, in our selection model we consider a variable (demand finance) which
represents the firms’ general need for external capital to finance innovation projects.
On a five-point Likert scale, firms where asked to rate the importance of external fi-
nance for their innovation activities (5: very high, 4: high, 3: medium, 2: low, 1: very
low/none). We transformed it in a dichotomous variable taking the value of one for
firms that report external finance to have at least some importance. We employ this
variable in the first step of our analyses to take into account endogenous selection of
firms seeking external finance.
Independent variables
Behavioral variables: Innovation intensity In the survey, firms list whether they
have introduced new products, processes, or services that are either new only to the
firm (incremental innovations) or to the market/world (radical innovations)2 and if,
how many. Since incremental innovations are in contrast to radical innovations already
to some extend known to the market, we associate them with less uncertainty and a
greater capacity to be understood by the financier. As such, they are expected show
a somewhat smaller effect on the firm’s access to external financing.
However, we do not posit a linear relationship of innovation intensity and the fol-
lowing structural variables (size, age) and the likelihood of facing financial constraints,
but rather one with decreasing marginal effects. Once a firm develops a track record
for a number of years, asymmetric information problems stemming from a lack of his-
torical data are likely to be alleviated, and further benefits from aging only manifest
in possible reputational effects and increasing strength of the financier-firm relation-
ship. We suggest the same pattern for size, where at a certain size legal disclosure
2This distinction is in line with what is commonly used in innovation studies using CIS surveys.
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requirements and the establishment of professional finance and accounting manage-
ment eliminate a substantial share of information asymmetries. While innovation is
considered as a source of information asymmetries, we also expect this effect to soften
with increasing innovation intensity. Firms that frequently engage in a high number
of innovation projects are likely to develop routines to manage this process in a more
structured way, which may be associated with increasing documentation and therefore
higher transparency. Therefore, the variables incremental and radical innovation in-
tensity are used in all models as the logarithmic transformation of the number of new
products, processes, or services introduced in the corresponding observation period.
Structural characteristics: Firm size and age We include the firm specific structural
characteristics most commonly associated with financial constraints, size (in number of
employees) and age (in years), and coined these two variables respectively the liability
of newness and liability of smallness. As discussed above, to account for assumed
decreasing marginal impact as well as the skewedness of the variables distribution, size
and age enter the model in their natural logarithm.
Outcome: Perceived current and future performance Firms were asked about the
development of their realized profits in the current period (increased, same, decreased).
A reported realized increase in profits in the observation period obviously represents
a positive signal for financiers, which should decrease the firm’s likelihood of being
financially constrained, and vice versa.3 We code this question in two dummy variables,
first real result + indicating positive, and real result − indicating negative self-
reported results in the current period. We introduce a dynamic perspective on external
innovation finance by way of also incorporating the firm’s self-reported expected future
performance of the firm. Here, we utilized another question, where firms reported their
predicted development of profits for the next period (increase, same, decrease), which
we also code in two dummy variables, indicating positive (exp result +) and negative
(exp result −) profit expectations. Assuming the firms to have the most complete set
3However, this only holds true for the minimum level of documentation and accounting transparency
that enables a firm to convincingly prove its credibility to external financiers.
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of information to make prediction regarding their future performance, in absence of
information asymmetries we associated positive profit expectation with less financial
constraints.
Conditions for innovation We further utilized the answers to additional questions
on general opinions and impressions of the firm that might provide insights regarding
the type of innovation likely to be produced. Imp. tech represents a dummy variable
taking a value of one if the firm believes that technological knowledge is of high or
highest importance to its business (on a five-point Likert scale), indicating that the
firm is technology based. Imp. IPR relates to the firm’s assessment of the importance
of intellectual property protection, and is an indicator for more technology-based firms
operating in an environment where innovation outcomes can be codified and protected.
Finally, Imp. market is about the belief that market knowledge is vital for the firm,
indicating competitive, complex, and changing market conditions.
Control variables
The region: First, the firm’s environment is assumed to influence its access to
external financing. Denmark’s North Jutland region can be categorized as a fairly
peripheral one. Modern instruments of innovation finance such as private equity and
venture capital are scarcer there, which leaves debt as the predominant form of external
innovation finance. Since the assessment of small, young, and innovative firms can
be facilitated by tacit knowledge exchange and social proximity, we expect firms in
regions outside the Aalborg region, North Jutland’s urban core, to be more likely to
face financial constraints. Therefore, in some models we also include further dummy
variables indicating the firm is located in the inner Aalborg metropolitan region (region
1 ), or the larger, relatively less densely (but compared with the rest of northern Jutland
still high) populated region around Aalborg (region 2 ).
The industry: Firms in the manufacturing industry usually embody a higher share
of tangible assets suitable to serve as collateral, and thus are favored by asset-based
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creditability evaluation techniques. Furthermore, production processes and their out-
put may be better understood and valued than the somewhat intangible work of service
firms. Therefore we suggest firms in the manufacturing industry to be less likely to
face financial constraints.
Ownership structure and legal form: We also expect the firm’s ownership struc-
ture to matter. If it is a subsidiary, it may be nurtured by its parent company, and
thus be less in need of external financing. Additionally, it may draw on the reputa-
tion and credibility of its parent company, which eases the way to obtaining external
financing. The firms’ legal form makes them likely to differ in demand and access to
external capital. Publicly traded companies obviously finance themselves on public
capital markets for the most part and therefore have less demand for other sources of
external financing than firms of other legal forms. Among privately owned businesses,
we assume limited liability firms to be more likely to experience financial constraints
than sole proprietorship, in which the firm’s credit is backed by the private wealth of
the entrepreneur.
3.3 Data Analysis and Descriptive Statistics
The refined data set represents an unbalanced panel containing 8,447 observations
of 2,723 unique firms. Only a subpopulation of firms was asked to answer the set of
innovation and financial constraints-related questions relevant for this study, which
leaves us with 2,822 observations of 1,169 unique firms, whose participation in the
different survey waves ranges from 1 to 12, where about 25% of firms participated in
2 or fewer and 95% in 7 or fewer waves. The participation by wave ranges from 135
in 2013 to a peak of 316 in 2010. The distribution of firms over years, regions, and
industries can be found in table 5 in the appendix.
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics at the firm level through the different
waves. 63% of the firms in our sample express the need for external finance at all, while
the others prefer to finance innovation projects by internal means. 17% report that
they experienced financial constraints in external innovation finance in the correspond-
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Dependent Variables
need finance 2,822 0.63 0.48 0 1
constraints 2,093 0.17 0.38 0 1
Independent Variables
sizecount∗ 2,822 49.78 95.79 1 1600
agecount∗ 2,822 17.66 12.68 1 135
planned inno 2,822 0.68 0.47 0 1
inc. innocount∗ 2,822 4.06 10.6 0 100
rad innocount∗ 2,822 1.59 6.3 0 99
imp. tech 2,822 0.09 0.29 0 1
imp. ipr 2,822 0.09 0.29 0 1
imp. market 2,822 0.23 0.42 0 1
real result + 2,822 0.39 0.49 0 1
real result - 2,822 0.23 0.42 0 1
exp result + 2,822 0.39 0.49 0 1
exp result - 2,822 0.16 0.37 0 1
Control Variables
region 1 2,822 0.40 0.49 0 1
region 2 2,822 0.58 0.49 0 1
firm subsidiary 2,822 0.23 0.45 0 1
∗: For the sake of clarity, firm size (employees),age (years), incremental and radical
innovation intensity (innovation count) in full number and not in logarithmic
transformation.
ing observation period, which is about a quarter of firms expressing financial needs.
This result roughly match with comparable studies. The average firm has slightly fewer
than 50 employees and an age of about 17 years, where both characteristics skew high
and positive. Over 40% report that they introduced at least one product, process, or
service new to the firm in the corresponding period, while a slightly higher percentage
introduced innovations new to the industry and the market, and roughly 70% planned
to start new innovation projects in the next year, what sums up to an average of 4.06
incremental and 1.59 radical innovations per firm and year. About a quarter of the
firms consider knowledge on market conditions as crucial to their success, whereas
only 9% think so regarding technological knowledge and IPR. 39% of firms are opti-
mistic about their current or future development of profits, while 16% are pessimistic
about future profits, which indicates on average a healthy business climate, despite the
financial crisis during the observation period.
Table 5 in the appendix provides a breakdown of the firms need for finance, expe-
rienced financial constraints, and incremental and radical innovation activity by year,
region and industry. Financial constraints show to peak in the years 2003, 2009 and
2012, when (related) demand for external finance for innovation projects is also at it’s
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high as is the average intensity of radical innovation. The manufacturing industry
appears to be the most innovative and therefore has also the highest demand for inno-
vation finance. The results of a bivariate analysis, presented in a pairwise correlation
matrix in Table 3, provide the first insights into the general interplay among innovation
intensity, the need for financing, and credit constraints.
Table 2: Correlation Matrix
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
need fi-
nance
constraints region_2 size age subsidiary inno inc
(1) constraints 0.451∗
(2) region 2 -0.065∗ -0.060∗
(3) size -0.080∗ -0.106∗ -0.044∗
(4) age -0.062∗ -0.054∗ -0.037 0.230∗
(5) subsidiary -0.108∗ -0.0779∗ 0.023 0.045∗ 0.076∗
(6) inno inc 0.008 -0.007 0.026 0.194∗ 0.051∗ 0.013
(7) inno rad -0.006 0.037 0.020 0.060∗ -0.031 -0.038 0.430∗
(8) imp tech 0.007 -0.015 0.028 0.006 0.008 0.017 -0.004
(9) imp ipr 0.033 -0.002 0.033 -0.003 -0.070∗ -0.039 0.060∗
(10) imp market 0.012 -0.034 0.015 0.054∗ 0.012 -0.002 0.072∗
(11) real result + -0.065∗ -0.042∗ 0.055∗ 0.008 0.004 -0.045∗ 0.031
(12) real result - 0.060∗ 0.075∗ -0.055∗ 0.000 -0.008 -0.014 0.039
(13) exp result + 0.035 0.039 0.072∗ -0.027 -0.099∗ -0.017 0.094∗
(14) exp result - 0.008 0.010 -0.047∗ -0.020 0.031 -0.037 -0.030
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
inno rad imp tech imp ipr imp mar-
ket
real re-
sult +
real re-
sult -
exp re-
sult +
(8) imp tech 0.005
(9) imp ipr 0.105∗ 0.142∗
(10) imp market 0.049∗ 0.114∗ 0.251∗
(11) real result + 0.053∗ 0.011 0.012 0.017
(12) real result - 0.005 0.015 -0.015 0.003 -0.430∗
(13) exp result + 0.097∗ 0.017 0.025 0.028 0.115∗ 0.116∗
(14) exp result - -0.033 -0.015 -0.040 -0.013 -0.020 0.129∗ -0.341*
∗: p < 0.01, two-tailed Pearson correlation
As expected, both age and size are negatively correlated with the need for exter-
nal finance as well as with financial constraints. Surprisingly, neither the intensity
of incremental innovation nor of radical innovation shows non-negligible correlation
coefficients in magnitude or significance. This is in line with Christensen (2007), who
in a bivariate setting found no evidence that innovative firms are particularly affected
by financial constraints. No strong correlation indicating collinearity can be found.
3.4 Model Setup and Empirical Strategy
Our data set represents an unbalanced panel, where roughly half of the firms par-
ticipated in one wave and the other half in two to twelve, regressively developing.
Since the methods available for unbalanced panel data regressions with selection and
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dichotomous dependent variables are very limited, we instead choose to use pooled
data and include year dummies to capture year effects. To address the issue of serial
correlation among multiple observations of the same firm, we relax the assumption
that standard errors are independently and identically distributed by clustering them
at the firm level, which allows for within-group correlation. Furthermore, we used
multivariate imputation techniques in the rare cases of missing data on firm character-
istics and survey question replies of the independent variables, where for every single
variable less then 5% of observations show missing cases.
The dichotomous nature of our dependent variable and the very nature of our survey
data suggest the use of a probit model. To analyze the interplay between supply
and demand for external financing for innovation, we chose a two-stage model with
endogenous selection, which allowed us to construct a consistent model for decisions
both to seek and to obtain financing for innovation projects, where the former obviously
represents the prerequisite for the latter. This is done with a technique equivalent to
the well-established two-stage Heckman correction in linear models (Heckman, 1979),
applied for bivariate probit models (Van de Ven and Van Praag, 1981) and estimating
a firm’s likelihood to experience financial constraints by full maximum likelihood.
We execute our econometric analysis as follows. Model one includes control variables
for the corresponding year, the firm’s industry affiliation and its legal form, some basic
firm characteristics, its incremental and radical innovation intensity (hypothesis 1a,b),
and its perceived importance of some factors associated with innovation. In model two,
we add an interaction term between the firms’ incremental innovation intensity and its
structural characteristics size and age (inc. inno*sizeref , inc. inno*ageref ). To test
the interplay between innovation intensity and the liability of newness and smallness,
we reverse the magnitude of both age and size to have high values for young and small
firms, and vice versa. We do the same in model three for radical innovation intensity
(rad. inno*sizeref , rad. inno*ageref ). In both models we test if young and small
firms are over-proportionally affected by the assumed negative impact of innovation
intensity on the access to external finance (hypothesis 2a,b), and by their comparison
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if the type of innovation activity matters (hypothesis 2c). Then in model four we add
first the firms reported increase (real result +) or decrease (real result -) in profits
in the current period, and in model five the firms expectation for the next period
(exp result +, exp result -) to test the interplay between realized and perceived firm
level outcomes and different forms of innovation intensity (hypothesis 3a,b).
4 Results and Discussion
4.1 Demand for external innovation finance
In the first stage of the model to be found in table 6 in the appendix, we test the
likelihood of having demand for external capital to finance innovation projects. Even
though this stage is not of main interest for our analysis, it is necessary for endogeneity
reasons and results may be interesting in themselves. Surprisingly, demand for external
innovation finance appears at first glance to be quite inelastic to firm characteristics
and innovation intensity, which holds true for incremental and radical innovation alike.
Firms that are a subsidiary have a significantly lower demand for external finance,
probably because they are likely to be supplied with funding by their parent company.
The variable region2 (firms in the wider, less densely populated Aalborg area) has a
negative sign and is significant in all models indicating that demand for external finance
of innovation is not as widespread among firms in these regions as is the case in the
inner urban area. Realized positive profits decreases the demand for external finance.
This indicates that, in line with the pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984)
and findings of Mina et al. (2013), firms indeed prefer to finance innovation activities
with internal funds such as accumulated profits. Contrary to initial expectations, the
firm’s size and age have no significant effect on its demand for financing, which appears
puzzling at first glance, since the majority of theories and evidence claim that small
and young firms are in greater need of external financing. Overall, we see a somewhat
limited explanatory power of traditional firm characteristics and innovation indicators
alike for the financial needs of firms in our sample. It should, however, be reiterated
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that the bulk of the earlier literature has focused on the supply side rather than on
demand. Yet, while appreciating the importance of considering the interplay between
demand and supply of capital, our focus in this analysis lays on the constraints firms
meet to their innovation financing.
4.2 Supply for external innovation finance
In the second stage, we test the firm’s likelihood to experience financial constraints.
In model one, we see that size matters to obtaining financing, as increasing size reduces
the chances of being constrained, significant at least at a 5% level. In line with hy-
pothesis 3a, radical innovation intensity is associated with a higher probability of being
financially constrained, significant on 5% level. Yet, this holds not true for incremental
innovation, which shows a negative but not significant coefficient, lending support to
hypothesis 3b, and at the same time calling for more nuanced understanding of the
relationship between different types of firm level innovation activities and financial
constraints. Indeed, while financiers seem to generally cope with “new-to-the-firm” in-
cremental innovation, more radical and uncertain “new-to-the-world” activities appear
to deter them.
In model two, we introduce interaction terms with the structural characteristics age
and size and the behavioral variable (inc.inno ∗ sizerev, inc.inno ∗ agerev)4. We do
not find an significant effect of being small and at the same time displaying a high
innovation intensity (inc.inno ∗ sizerev), leading to a rejection of hypothesis 2a. In
contrast, the interaction with sizerev indeed shows a positive coefficient significant at
the 5% level, indicating in favor of hypothesis 2b that high innovation intensity and
smallness indeed amplify each others negative effect on access to external finance.
In model three we introduce interaction terms of again the firm’s age and size with
its intensity in radical innovation activity (inno rad). While young and radically in-
novative firms do not display a statistically significant tendency to face experience
financial constraints, their small and radically innovative ones do again, with even a
4The ref superscript indicates the variable to be reversed, so that originally highest values now
represent the lowest ones, and vice versa.
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higher amplitude (average marginal effects more than 3 times higher) than their incre-
mentally innovating peers. This finding is in line with hypothesis 2c, indicating again
that the type of innovation indeed influences financiers capital allocation decisions
interdependent with other firm characteristics.
Model four tests for the additional effect of being a firm reporting to be a good or
a bad performer, which we operationalized by the positive or negative development
of profits in the observation period. While good performance in this model leads
to no benefits in accessing external finance, bad performance indeed appears to be
penalized by capital markets. The coefficient for negative profit development shows
significance at 10% level, lending partial and weak support to hypothesis 3a. However,
while realized outcomes appear to at least slightly matter, we see no significant effect
at all for the firms profit expectations introduced in model five. Interestingly, when
including realized and expected outcome characteristics, in both model four and five
the coefficient as well as significance of radical innovation intensity decreases. This
might indicate a more nuanced relationship between innovation activity and outcome
related to technology. Yet, the firms forward looking assessment of its economic devel-
opment seems to not influence the capital allocation decisions by financiers, indicating
persistent information asymmetries and/or different methods of projection.
4.3 Robustness tests
To evaluate the robustness of our findings, we carried out additional robustness tests.
First, we ran only the supply model (stage 2) in a fixed effects probit model. For our
structural and innovation variables, we also tried different transformations (other than
the here applied logarithmic one) such as the squareroot, and also the non-transformed
terms. For our outcome variable, we also replaced the self reported profits by balance
sheet data from Danish register data (which is unfortunately only available for a subset
of firms). While mostly not as pronounced, all results point in a similar direction. The
period we analyze span across the financial crisis and it can be presumed that this has
an effect on conditions for obtaining external finance (Cowling et al., 2012; Vermoesen
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et al., 2009). In our empirical analyses we included year dummies to capture potential
effects from changes in business cycles but additionally we introduced a number of
macroeconomic business cycle indicators but found no effect from this.
5 Conclusion
Our approach in this study was to build on previous theories and studies on demand
and constraints for financing for different types of firms and to add new, improved ways
of analyzing this problem area. Our hypotheses were built to render a more nuanced
picture of the financial constraints problem than has been presented to date. We were
able to analyze this problem area from a longitudinal perspective, and although our
overall results are in contrast to some previous findings in the literature we did find
new insights that contribute an additional understanding of financial constraints.
It has been claimed that by and large firms who apply for credit gets it (Nightingale
and Coad, 2014) but that some types of firms may be financially constrained. Regard-
ing the demand side our results indicate weak systematic patterns in which types of
firms are demanding external finance. Unsurprisingly, the realized, positive economic
results decreases demand for external finance as does the firms’ status as subsidiary.
Our analysis on the supply of external capital revealed that the effect of innovation
per se on capital demand and supply is not uniform, but rather interdependent on
other firm characteristics. We furthermore find the type of innovation to matter.
While incremental innovation is rewarded by financiers, the results for more radical or
technology-based innovations are more ambiguous.
It is likely that in a small and dense region, where innovation activities are primarily
incremental and not science-based, financiers are better able to cope with asymmetries
of information and other reasons for credit rationing. Hence, static, non-innovative
firms are, in our analyses, financially constrained, while firms with some innovation
are rewarded, and technology-based, high-tech innovation firms are constrained. This
is congruent with some earlier studies that posit that “some, not too much, innovation
is good” (Freel, 2000, 2007).
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Our findings lead us to question the generalization of existing theories in the field.
Whereas financial markets are often seen as prime examples of full information and
extended mobility of production factors, our results indicate that the demand and
supply of the finance nexus is nuanced and highly contextual. As mentioned, an-
other, complementary interpretation is that capital markets work differently in small,
dense environments because information flows more easily and networks of firms and
of financiers facilitate both mitigating information asymmetries and the insourcing of
knowledge on capital market reactions (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). This is consistent
with (Bellucci et al., 2014) who find that when financiers have well-established lending
relationships with firms, they evaluate innovation positively, whereas the innovation
variable has a negative impact on access to credit for firms that are more likely to
suffer from information asymmetries. Proximity is, in turn, a facilitator of reducing
asymmetric information, hence increasing access to financing. It is likely that the re-
gional context is a powerful explanation as to why existing theories do not seem to
fit our case. This does not disprove these established theories, but points to the need
to take contextual factors into account and to evaluate these theories differently in
different regional settings.
The findings not only complicate the theoretical understanding of access to financing,
but may also have policy implications. Most public support programs for access to
financing place restrictions on eligibility; most often their financing is available only to
firms that are young, small, innovative, or some combination thereof, at least in some
regions. The results of our study indicate a need for careful consideration of these
criteria.
A number of limitations apply to how far we can go in drawing universally valid
conclusions. The study was confined to a small region in a small country. As we
have argued, entrepreneurial finance is to a large extent contextual (Ning et al., 2015),
and the results may have been different in another financial system. We also treated
financiers and types of financing as if they were homogeneous. In reality, there are
vast differences between, for example, venture capital and bank financing, and different
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results might be seen if the analyses were confined to only one type of capital (Brown
et al., 2012).
For further research, we suggest continuing to explore the impact of innovation
types on financial constraints. For example, the latest round of CIS-survey results
show that North Jutland has now moved up from the bottom of the rankings to
become the most innovative region in Denmark, despite still being the one with the
lowest rate of R&D activities. Furthermore, these survey results show that the major
difference between other regions and North Jutland is that the latter’s firms have been
engaged in organizational change to a larger extent. The capital markets may view
such innovations particularly positively.
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Appendix
Table 4: Variable Descriptions
Variable Type Description
Dependent Variables
demand finance dichotomous Firm in need for external finance
constraints dichotomous Firms experienced finance constraints
Behavior: Innovation intensity
inc. inno continuous Firms number of introduced incremental innovation, natural logarithm:
ln(1+x)
rad. Inno continuous Firms number of introduced radical innovation, natural logarithm:
ln(1+x)
inno planned dichotomous Firm plans innovation in next period
Structure
size continuous Firms employees, natural logarithm: ln(x)
age continuous Firms age in years, natural logarithm: ln(x)
Outcome: Performance
real result + dichotomous Firms realized profits positive
real result − dichotomous Firms realized profits negative
exp result + dichotomous Firms expected profits positive
exp result − dichotomous Firms expected profits negative
Behavior: Innovation intensity
imp. technology dichotomous Perception: High importance of access to technology
imp. IP R dichotomous Perception: High importance of IPR
imp. market dichotomous Perception: High importance of market knowledge
Controls
region 1 dichotomous Firm located in the central Aalborg region
region 2 dichotomous Firm located in a metropolitan region
industry dichotomous Firm industry, (0) others, (1) manufacturing, (2) service, communica-
tion and finance
legal form categorical Firm legal form, (0) others, (1) public traded, (2) limited liability, (3)
private
subsidiary dichotomous Firm is a subsidiary
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics by Categories
Category N Percent demand
finance,
mean
constraints,
mean
inc. inno
intensity,
mean
rad. inno
intensity,
mean
Total 2822.00 100.00 0.63 0.17 4.06 1.59
Distribution and characteristics of firms by year
2000 207.00 7.34 0.71 0.18 3.20 1.13
2001 200.00 7.09 0.74 0.16 4.45 2.24
2002 179.00 6.34 0.69 0.11 3.41 1.53
2003 188.00 6.66 0.76 0.21 5.80 2.90
2004 196.00 6.95 0.61 0.18 5.62 2.06
2005 187.00 6.63 0.66 0.13 4.57 1.32
2006 193.00 6.84 0.66 0.12 4.34 1.20
2007 179.00 6.34 0.67 0.12 4.18 1.46
2008 200.00 7.09 0.72 0.18 4.80 1.30
2009 260.00 9.21 0.76 0.25 7.44 3.71
2010 316.00 11.20 0.48 0.18 2.47 0.82
2011 212.00 7.51 0.48 0.16 1.89 0.69
2012 170.00 6.02 0.48 0.23 1.41 0.61
2013 135.00 4.78 0.48 0.15 2.69 0.83
Distribution and characteristics of firms by industry
manufacturing 1442.00 51.10 0.68 0.17 4.73 1.89
service & finance 555.00 19.67 0.48 0.19 3.18 1.26
others 825.00 29.23 0.65 0.16 3.50 1.29
Note: incremental and radical innovation intensity (innovation count) in full number
and not in logarithmic transformation.
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